As well as achieving several mitigation objectives, China has further pledged to become carbon neutral by 2060 (Table 1). Carbon neutrality refers to net-zero CO 2 emissions — a balance between all anthropogenic emissions from fossil fuel combustion, industrial production processes, land-use changes and CO 2 removals from land, ocean and human society (such as carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS)). Since China is at present the largest carbon emitter in the world, its pathway to net-zero emissions (including all greenhouse gases) will be essential in meeting the 2° C temperature limit targets outlined by the Paris Agreement. However, achieving carbon neutrality by 2060 cannot depend solely on measures adopted to meet 2020 intensity reduction targets. Instead, China must break down the lock-in of fossil fuel-based energy supply systems and develop effective negative-emission technologies. Indeed, while renewables and energy-efficiency improvements are projected to contribute approximately 75% of the cumulative emission reductions up to 2060 (refs66,67), the remaining emissions rely on offsets by negative-emission technologies (Fig. 6). Key elements in China’s carbon neutrality targets are now summarized.
Fig. 6: Contributions needed to achieve 2060 carbon neutrality target. Illustration of how negative emissions, renewables and improved efficiencies can reduce net emissions, and thus achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. Open circles denote the average baseline scenario emissions from five models7,66,67 (IEA Stated Policy Scenario, IPAC, CE3METL, WITCH2016 and GCAM), and the solid black circles indicate the average emissions from the same models but with the 1.5° C limit. The error bars show the max-min spread of these models. All scenario data are rescaled to the same level in 2020 and extended to 2060, based on the assumption of achieving net-zero emission in 2060. Contributions of each component are collected from the IEA World Energy Outlook’s Sustainable Development Scenario66,67, where ‘Efficiency’ denotes end-use efficiency and fossil fuel subsidies reform, and ‘Negative emission needed’ covers nuclear, CCUS and other technologies66. To achieve carbon neutrality in 2060, improved efficiencies, renewables development and a large number of negative emissions technologies are needed. Full size image
Coal phase-out
To curb the increase in its energy consumption and achieve its mid-century carbon neutrality goal, China needs to transform its economy from carbon-intensive manufacturing to a more service-based economy, to increase the share of electricity end-use of energy and to decarbonize its electricity generation68,69.
The overarching task in this energy transition is to phase out coal (and other fossil fuel) consumption as early as possible and to expand non-fossil energy supply70. The Action Plan on Prevention and Control of Air Pollution facilitated this transition in 2013, reducing coal consumption in the most developed regions (such as the Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei provinces) to improve air quality71. Moreover, in 2017, the Chinese government specifically proposed reducing coal power capacity for the first time, aiming to eliminate, suspend and postpone coal power production capacity by more than 50 GW (ref.72). This strategy was intended to prevent overcapacity and to improve energy efficiencies in coal power. If these policies, and others, are followed at current rates73,74, China’s coal power generation and carbon emissions are expected to peak by 2027 (ref.75).
However, achieving coal phase-out will require firmer actions. Indeed, coal power installed capacity continues to increase, owing to growing energy demand. In 2020, for example, China commissioned 76% (38.4 GW) and retired 23% (8.6 GW) of global new coal plants, leading to a net 29.8 GW increase in its coal fleet76. Moreover, the construction of 210 new coal projects in 2015 following the decentralization of power plant approval77, the fact that most existing coal-fired power plants have been put into operation in the past 15 years78 and the approval of coal projects to boost economic growth following the COVID-19 pandemic all provide additional challenges to be met before China’s coal consumption and emissions can peak. If there is any future for coal-fired power plants in China, they will probably have to be retrofitted with CCUS.
According to the China Electricity Council, however, China is still striving to reach peak installed coal capacity by 2030, representing around 1,300 GW. Although this is in line with the 2030 goal of achieving peak carbon emissions, its achievement will necessitate rapid coal phase-out thereafter. These changes are consistent with government commitments to control coal-fired power generation projects and to limit the increase in coal consumption during the 14th and 15th FYPs. Nevertheless, targets for coal power installed capacity have not yet been set officially, either during the 14th FYP nor by 2030.
Non-fossil energy development
With this reduction in fossil-derived energy comes the need for a corresponding increase in renewable energy to meet growing energy demands. Indeed, by 2020, the share of coal power installed capacity dropped below 50% for the first time79. During the 13th FYP, non-fossil energy installed capacity grew at an average annual rate of 13.1%79, allowing the targets of 15% non-fossil energy to be met (Table 1). With continued increases, China is also on the path to deliver the 25% target set up for 2030 (ref.73).
Achieving carbon neutrality, however, means that non-fossil fuel must account for 85% of the energy mix by 2050 (ref.80). Thus, renewables are at the core of the transition to carbon neutrality, given their vast resource potential81,82,83, low or no carbon emissions and declining costs. China aims to increase its wind and solar installed power generation capacity to over 1,200 GW by 2030 (ref.84), requiring a compound annual growth rate of around 10%79. Furthermore, China requires 1500–2600 GW wind capacity and 2200–2800 GW of solar capacity by 2050 to help achieve the Paris Agreement, roughly ten times the 2020 capacity85,86. Such a large-scale expansion of renewable energy necessitates fundamental changes in energy infrastructure, such as storage and transmissions, and calls for the energy market to integrate high penetration of renewables with grids.
Nuclear power might therefore form the basis of the required non-fossil energy development. In 2007, China released its Nuclear Power Medium- and Long-Term Development Plan (2005–2020), aiming to increase nuclear power generation installed capacity to 58 GW by 2020, although only 50 GW has been achieved79. As outlined by the 14th FYP, another 20 GW installed capacity of nuclear power generation will be put into operation, consistent with the target of 70 GW by 2025 (ref.87). By 2050, nuclear power generation is estimated to contribute 120–500 GW (refs86,88). This large range creates a huge gap that otherwise will need to be filled by solar, wind or CCUS in a low nuclear scenario85,89,90.
The pathways towards achieving the carbon peak and neutrality goals is complicated by the combined effects of technology, resources, cost, policy and market competition. For example, the cost of renewables and storage has declined markedly. If this trend continues, 62% of China’s electricity could come from non-fossil sources by 2030 at an 11% lower cost compared with a business-as-usual approach91. Furthermore, different transition pathways deliver similar carbon mitigation results, but could have different implications on the energy economy, on water and land resources92,93, and potentially on environmental pollution and human health94,95. Sectors that consume energy, such as the building96, transport97 and industry98 sectors also have a crucial role in filling the carbon mitigation gap. As such, adoption of technology, changes in human behaviour and policy measures that increase energy efficiency and restrain demand are equally important at the other side of the transition to clean energy.
Negative-emission technology
In addition to expanded renewables and improved energy efficiencies, negative emissions (removing CO 2 from the atmosphere)99 will also be needed to achieve carbon neutrality in 2060. Specifically, negative emissions are expected to contribute nearly 25% of total emissions reduction from 2020 to 2060 (Fig. 6).
Afforestation
Afforestation is a negative-emission technology that has been widely utilized in China. Indeed, efforts to expand afforestation have made it the largest contributor (42%) of the observed global greening trend100. During the 1980s and 1990s, the net terrestrial sink in China was about 0.19–0.26 Pg C per year (around 0.7–1.0 Gt CO 2 per year), offsetting around 28–37% of China’s anthropogenic CO 2 emissions in same period101. By 2010–2016, however, these terrestrial sinks reached 1.11 ± 0.38 Pg C per year (about 4.0 ± 1.4 Gt CO 2 per year), accounting for nearly 45% of anthropogenic emissions102. Further afforestation could be achieved by preserving and expanding forest cover, especially in areas that are suffering from desertification103.
However, owing to the fact that afforestation-related emissions reductions last only as long as the planted trees are growing, this strategy presents greater risks than a strategy that focuses more on gross reduction cuts. Under these circumstances, advanced water resource management and treatment technologies, along with precision agriculture and land-use management, could be deployed to ensure that most, or all, of the increased biomass in the afforested areas is preserved indefinitely103. In particular, commercial and residential land occupation would need to be limited. By doing so, China’s forest biomass carbon stock could increase by more than 50% by the 2050s104,105,106.
Blue carbon
China’s seas also have huge carbon sink potential (so-called ‘blue carbon’), providing ample opportunities to implement a variety of negative-emission technologies. For example, in coastal zones, the organic carbon storage of mangroves, salt marshes and seagrass beds is 1.3 Mt CO 2 per year107. Carbon sinks in open seas are much larger, with preliminary estimates suggesting that sedimentary organic carbon storage in marginal seas of China’s coastal shelf is 75.1 Mt CO 2 per year and that primary productivity of large-scale culture algae in China is approximately 12.9 Mt CO 2 per year107. In addition, artificial upwelling projects could help to increase carbon sequestration in breeding areas by 0.3 Mt CO 2 per year107. Overall, the amount of carbon stored in and exported to China’s seas is over 300 Mt CO 2 per year107. More efforts are called to increase these oceanic sinks, such as by alleviating offshore eutrophication by reducing the use of inorganic fertilizers on land, enhancing ocean alkalinization, and by upgrading mariculture areas by artificial upwelling107.
Other negative-emission technologies
CCUS also offers one of the most important technologies for negative emissions, despite concerns regarding costs, technical challenges and actual contributions to climate mitigation108,109,110,111. For example, the potential capacity for CO 2 storage in China is estimated to be 1,800 to 3,000 Gt CO 2 (refs112,113), hundreds of times higher than current annual CO 2 emissions (about 10 Gt CO 2 ). Accordingly, China has started promoting CCUS trials since the 12th FYP. These include three commercial carbon capture and storage (CCS) facilities in operation (out of 26 worldwide), with an annual maximum capture capacity of around 0.82 Mt CO 2 , accounting for approximately 2% of global CCS storage113. A further three commercial CCS facilities are also under construction or in early development, and are expected to increase the capture capacity by around 1.8 Mt CO 2 per year113, as are 13 pilot and demonstration CCS facilities114.
We note, however, that current CCS facilities are capturing CO 2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion (such as coal-fired power plants) or fossil/mineral process emissions (such as clinker production and numerous petrochemical processes), reducing them to a lower or even near-zero level. Negative emissions are only possible through bioenergy combustion with CCS or through other methods that capture CO 2 emissions from biogenic rather than fossil sources115. Deployment of bioenergy combustion with CCS is still some way off in China116. Thus, to have a more important role in China’s carbon neutrality, CCUS technologies must be developed rapidly and both CCS and bioenergy combustion with CCS facilities need to be deployed on a large scale as soon as possible. Otherwise, the contributions of CCUS to China’s carbon neutrality before 2060 will probably be minimal.
Carbonation of cement, one of the less frequently discussed negative-emission technologies, has considerable potential for carbon uptake117,118,119,120. It is estimated to have contributed a cumulative sink of around 6.2 Gt CO 2 in China from 1930 to 2019 (ref.120). Accordingly, improving the weathering of cement and other alkaline solid wastes has become one of the major ways to mitigate emissions119. Recycling construction materials will not only substantially increase the carbonation of cement materials, but also potentially reduce the energy intensity of the construction industry by 90%121. To achieve the 2060 net-zero emission target, China must therefore recycle 100% of its construction materials and industrial byproducts, ideally by 2030 (ref.121). Other CCUS technologies might also be improved through the recycling of biomass and cascade utilization of energy and materials. It is of top priority for both central government and local governments to devise and enforce the corresponding regulations and laws.
Direct air capture technology is emphasized as one of the most important negative-emission technologies, with large-scale potential of CO 2 removal; these physically or chemically adsorb CO 2 in the air directly122,123. However, direct air capture technology is still immature and expensive and it has not been listed as an efficient effort in any official documents in China yet.
Low-carbon cities
Cities have been the main battlefields for fighting climate change in China124,125,126,127, particu
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